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 Exercises in Futility: 
Post-War Automobile-Trade Negotiations between 
Japan and the United States
1
 
In commenting in an Op-Ed piece in the January 7, 1992 edition of The New York 
Times on the then up-coming trade talks between Japan and the United States, A. M. 
Rosenthal perceptively wrote: 
President Bush [Sr.] lands in Tokyo with 21 top American business 
executives and a full cargo of economic evasion, self-delusion, bombast, and 
prefabricated agreements that cleverly avoid the realities of the problems between 
the United States and Japan. 
But that's all right -- it will be fair trade at best. The Japanese will meet 
him with their own complete product line of economic hypocrisy, including that 
new and fast-growing speciality, contempt lightly camouflaged as compassion. 
So the mission will leave the United States and Japan in exactly their 
present positions -- the Japanese using their skills, social strengths, history and 
every trick in the trade to remain powerful and growing, the Americans wasting 
their own rich talents and national heritage, looking up now and then for a good 
cry. 
The reason for the failure will be that neither the U.S. nor Japan talk 
candidly to each other or to their own people about the core reasons for the 
problems and what can be done to solve them. 
And, just as important, both sides do not acknowledge that not everything 
can be solved. Some problems between them are deep in national social contracts 
that neither intends to change .   2
For almost 25 years prior to this session in Tokyo, the United  States and Japan 
had been talking seriously about automobile-trade issues; and for the same almost 25 
years nothing of any substance had happened as a consequence of the negotiations. 
Throughout the period, the Japanese stood accused of unfair trade practices of one sort or 
another. In response to American pressure, Japan agreed to a number of measures, each 
supposedly directed towards the resolution of particular problems. Yet each turned out to 
have little or no effect. By 1997, when the problems seemed to have melted away on their 
own (Japan was mired in a deep and continuing recession, the outlook for American 
automobile manufacturers had improved independently of the results of any negotiations, 
and China had passed Japan as the leading source of the U.S. trade deficit), an 
unblemished, more-than-25-year record of failed automobile-trade negotiations had been 
established. 
Why is it that so much effort and energy devoted to negotiations over so many 
years never produced anything substantial? There are, no doubt, a variety of possible 
reasons for this failure. For example, since there was much at stake in terms of jobs and 
economic performance in the automobile industries of the two countries, the lack of 
negotiation progress could be attributed to a willingness by each party to mislead and 
prevaricate to achieve their respective ends. The present approach, however, presumes 
that the negotiations were undertaken with normal honesty and good faith on both sides 
and interprets their failure in terms of the fundamental cultural, social, and economic 
differences between the two countries.
2 It suggests, in particular, that the negotiators 
either ignored or did not understand what was motivating the other side, and the   3
unalterable cultural, social, and economic constraints under which the other side 
operated. This, in turn, led to unproductive interaction and eventual failure. 
The paper begins by presenting some background information. It then describes 
the history of automobile-trade negotiations between the 1970's and mid 1990's, and 
concludes by interpreting and evaluating that history as indicated above. 
I 
For most of the 20
th century, the automobile could be seen as the trademark of 
American industry, ingenuity, culture and power. More than anything else it exemplified 
the essence of Americanism to the rest of the world. In the wake of the innovative 
revolution in automobile production in the early decades of the 1900's, the United States 
achieved a seemingly insurmountable superiority in efficiency and technology over all 
other car manufacturers of the world. In the 1960's, the Big Three American auto 
manufacturers of Ford, General Motors and Chrysler gave birth to the multinational 
corporations that dominate today's global economy by procuring large market shares in 
countries such as Great Britain and Australia. It was therefore a shock, not only to U.S. 
automobile producers but also to the prestige and psyche of America in general, that the 
fairy-tale of the U.S. car industry seemed destined for an unhappy ending in the 1970's 
and 1980's. 
The initial problems confronting American automakers were domestic and 
directly correlated with the general decline in U.S. worker productivity in relation to 
foreign laborers in the late 1960's. Such a trend was indigenous to the entire 
manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy. As American products became less price-
competitive with foreign ones, U.S. companies began to feel the pressure from increasing   4
domestic market shares held by imported manufactured goods. The inauguration of the 
U.S. government's policy promoting free trade as fundamental to world prosperity only 
made matters worse. Indeed, U.S. markets had become the most attractive in the world 
for foreign manufacturers, not only because of the unparalleled size and wealth of the 
American economy, but also because it was much easier to enter those markets than the 
traditionally more restricted ones of Europe and Asia. Such was the environment 
surrounding the U.S. auto industry in 1967 when, facing falling profit margins and 
declining domestic market shares, it appealed to the United States government for 
political aid to keep the foreigners out. 
Of course, the free trade policy stood in the way of any overt protectionist action 
the U.S. government could take. But it was able to use that policy as a bargaining chip to 
open up foreign markets to squeezed American automobile manufacturers. At the time, 
the most appealing market in the world outside of the U.S. was clearly in Japan. Japan 
had rebuilt its economy in the twenty years after World War II, and its yearly GNP was 
second only to that of the U.S. This Japanese economic recovery emerged, in part, from a 
protectionist trade policy that favored the growth of domestic industry over consumer 
welfare. Indeed, the United States government had initially promoted protection of weak 
Japanese industries as a means for that nation to recover from the destructive losses of  
the War. But by the late 1960's many American observers believed that the Japanese 
automobile industry was on firm footing as evidenced, in part, by its increasing 
penetration into American and European markets. Rather than harboring the development 
of weak industries, in their view the protectionist policy now acted as a barrier to free 
trade and competition.   5
Although the exact strength of the Japanese automotive industry in 1967 is 
difficult to gauge, the degree of protection it enjoyed is not. At that time, Japan levied a 
tariff of 30%-40% on foreign imports, taxing the smaller cars at the higher rate. A further 
domestic commodity tax was added that applied to both imported and domestically 
produced cars, and that varied between 15% and 40%.
3 The latter discriminated against 
larger cars by considerably more than they were favored in the tariff. Thus, the typically 
large American cars would be taxed at 40% (plus the tariff), while the small domestic 
Japanese cars that made up practically all of Japanese production at the time (and were 
not subject to the tariff since they were produced domestically), would only be subject to 
a tax of 15%. In addition, a semi-annual automobile tax was assessed on large cars at a 
rate of five times that applied to small ones.
4 The effects of these and other obstacles (to 
be noted below) to importing automobiles can be measured by the fact that, in 1966, 
Japan imported a mere 15,244 cars, 485 trucks, and 3 buses against a total domestic 
production of 2,286,399 vehicles.
5 Efforts to reduce the barriers and increase the 
importation of American cars would occupy more than 25 years of strenuous and vain 
negotiations. 
The Japanese justified the taxes and tariffs with the argument that they were 
necessary to further the growth of their industries; the aggrieved Americans claimed they 
were unfair trade practices. The Japanese insisted that the non-tariff tax differential 
between large and small cars was not meant to prevent American producers from selling 
cars in Japan. They argued that large cars were luxury items, and that, since Japan's 
infrastructure consisted at the time of very narrow streets and highways, it was 
appropriate for larger vehicles to be taxed at higher rates.
6 Moreover, unlike the U.S. car   6
industry, which centered around three very large manufacturers, Japanese production was 
segmented among many smaller companies (Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, Suzuki, 
Datsun, Toyo Kogo). MITI (the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry) 
thought that the small Japanese companies would be at a considerable disadvantage 
competing against the large American companies in a free market.
7 The Japanese thus 
began to reorganize their auto industry in an effort to make it strong enough to withstand 
future foreign competition. Japan pleaded for time for the reorganization process while 
the U.S. sought quicker trade liberalization via tariff reduction. Due to the high profits of 
Japanese automobile manufacturers, the United States did not see any need for Japanese 
reorganization. Japan responded with only partial liberalization in the area of automobile 
parts and promised further liberalization in the future. 
II 
Negotiations in the 1970's
In the early 1970's, American automobile-trade demands presented to the 
Japanese were still modest, as worries over international currency stability overshadowed 
particular automobile issues in the wake of the demise of the Breton-Woods system of 
setting currency values. When President Richard Nixon floated the dollar in 1971, it was 
hoped that the ensuing rise in the domestic prices of imported goods and fall in the 
foreign prices of U.S. export goods would substitute domestic consumption for imports 
and spur American exports. Nevertheless, the U.S. government exerted pressure on Japan 
to increase further the value of the yen in order to decrease Japan's trade surplus still 
more. Since this measure would also have made the Japanese domestic economy more 
vulnerable to foreign imports, Tokyo responded with a proposal of voluntary export   7
curbs.
8 Through a program worked out with industry officials, MITI imposed export 
controls on passenger cars, special cars and trucks, chassis, and motor cycles.
9 Although 
the exact form and extent of these export controls were not disclosed, the measures 
succeeded in mollifying the United States for the time being. 
Apart from preventing further inroads of Japanese vehicles into U.S. markets, the 
export controls had no tangible impact in the United States. But the Japanese economy 
felt the jolt immediately. In particular, a marked slowdown in the growth of the Japanese 
automobile industry from 64% in 1971 to 10.5% in 1972 ensued. In addition to the export 
controls, growth was further hindered by two 16% increases in the dollar price of the yen 
during two upward revaluations, first in the December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement and 
again in February of 1973.
10 The recessionary impact of the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 
also played a role. The net effect was a temporary stagnation in the Japanese automobile 
industry in the first half of the 1970's. 
With the domestic automobile market thoroughly saturated by the mid 1970's, 
export controls were dropped and Japanese producers turned to exports for growth.
11 This 
led to an expansion of global Japanese car exports from 2,680,000 units in 1975 to 
3,710,000 units in 1976 and to the expectation of over four million units for 1977.
12 By 
1977, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan was $8 billion and Japan's world-wide current 
account surplus stood at $10 billion. Even accounting for Japan's own deficit as a 
consequence of inflated oil prices and other energy costs due to the 1973 OPEC embargo, 
the impact of this surplus on nations with weaker economies that were still reeling from 
the high energy costs induced by that embargo was substantial.
13 As a result, Japan faced 
building resentment around the world. Regardless, by the late 1970's, Japan had   8
successfully utilized its exports to overcome the externally imposed energy cost increases 
from earlier in the decade along with the recession that had accompanied them. 
Pressure on Japan from the international community, led by the United States, to 
decrease its large trade surplus began to rise. But President Jimmy Carter, rejecting the 
Japanese export control solution of the early 1970's, opposed trade barriers of any sort on 
imported automobiles.
14 Instead, the United States pushed the Japanese to reduce tariffs 
and other barriers that interfered with free trade. It also urged Japan to stimulate its 
domestic economy, hoping thereby to boost the Japanese demand for imports.
15 
American leaders believed that an increase in demand for U.S. goods would revive its 
struggling manufacturers such as automobile producers. Charles Varik of the House 
Ways and Means Committee stated that the United States wanted Japan to turn its surplus 
into a deficit in two years in order to halt import related plant closings in the U.S.
16 Such 
demands were, of course, rather outlandish, but they reflected the enormous pressure on 
Japan to take action. 
The Japanese response, however, failed to meet American expectations. Nobuhiko 
Ushiba, the Japanese Minister of External Economic Affairs, blamed the appreciation of 
the yen for both the poor Japanese performance in resolving the trade imbalance and the 
need to export. Nevertheless, he promised a 7% growth in the Japanese economy for 
1978 (up from a projected 5.3% rate in 1977).
17 The effect on American exports to Japan, 
however, was expected to result in only a meager $735 million increase.
18 The Japanese 
made another concession in 1977. They lifted the automobile import tariff.
19 Perhaps as a 
consequence of these measures combined, by July of 1978 there was an increase in 
imported automobile sales in Japan of 16% from the same month in the previous year.   9
However, that figure still meant that only 4,856 foreign cars were sold in Japan that 
July.
20 Thus the concessions that Japan gave to the Carter administration turned out to 
have negligible effect. The U.S. was unable either to check the penetration of Japanese 
automakers into the U.S. market or to induce the Japanese to significantly increase their 
purchases of American cars. 
 
Reagan and Japanese Trade Policy
The 1970's exposed the widespread mismanagement within the U.S. automobile 
industry as the Big Three continued to produce large, fuel-guzzling behemoths despite 
the huge increases in the price of gasoline as a consequence of the OPEC oil embargo of 
1973 and the drastic production cuts by Saudi Arabia and Iran (the latter due to internal 
political turmoil) in 1979-80. The consumer market logically switched to the smaller, 
cheaper, and much more fuel-efficient Japanese cars. By 1980, the Japanese held 25% of 
the U.S. domestic automobile market. Remarkably, it was the Japanese growing market 
share and not the U.S. producers ineptitude that was blamed for the declining profits and 
increased unemployment in the U.S. automobile industry.
21 And the “restrictive” nature 
of the Japanese domestic car market (even in the absence of tariffs American 
manufacturers were having considerable difficulty selling cars in Japan) was held up as 
the cause of the U.S. auto industry's inability to export. In reply, the Japanese observed 
that American manufacturers did not seem to be interested in designing vehicles suitable 
for the Japanese market.
22 That market required (1) small fuel-efficient cars to negotiate 
the narrow Japanese streets and to compensate for the now high price of gasoline, and (2) 
the placement of the steering wheel on the right-hand side of the vehicle to accommodate   10
the Japanese practice of driving on the left side of the road. Indeed, the Big Three ignored 
the needs of both the Japanese and the United States car markets, and it was primarily 
this that prevented U.S. manufacturers from advancing in the Japanese auto market and 
allowed the Japanese automobile producers to establish a firm foothold in the United 
States. 
But apart from refusing to provide appropriate cars in the Japanese market, there 
was another reason why U.S. manufacturers were not selling many automobiles in Japan. 
For doing business successfully in Japan necessitates the establishment of long-term 
relations between manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. That system is grounded in 
the obligation-and-loyalty fundamentals of Japanese culture.
23 But American car 
manufacturers were not willing to take the time, energy, and money to enter into those 
relations in Japan and play the economic game according to Japanese rules. And even if it 
could, Japan was unwilling, with good reason, to alter major cultural tenets and economic 
structures to accommodate American demands. (The U.S. certainly would not do the 
same for the Japanese.) These facts were either not understood or ignored by both 
American automobile manufacturers and American negotiators who could only lamely, 
and repeatedly, accuse the Japanese of having closed their domestic markets to foreign 
producers and of engaging in unfair trading practices. 
Ronald Reagan made the car industry a political issue in the 1980 presidential 
election. President Carter, in response to Reagan's promise of a tougher stand on Japanese 
imports, exerted pressure on Japan for greater concessions. If increasing the selling of 
American cars in Japan was not possible, then access to Japan's lucrative automobile-
parts market by U.S. parts manufacturers was an acceptable alternative. Japan acquiesced   11
by removing its tariff on imports of automobile parts and agreed to increase purchases of 
American parts to $130 million (thrice the 1978 level).
24 These, however, were small 
concessions; they helped neither U.S. manufacturers nor Carter's re-election bid. 
U.S. car producers tried on their own to improve sales and profits by making 
strategic alliances with their Japanese counterparts. Chrysler, the weakest of the Big 
Three, had had a working relationship with Mitsubishi since 1971. Each would use the 
other's distribution network to sell their cars in the other's market. By 1980 the two were 
engaged in a joint venture to produce the subcompact models of Chrysler's U.S. line. 
These models included the Colt, Challenger, Champ, and Sapporo, and accounted for 
20% of Chrysler's domestic sales.
25 Nevertheless, Chrysler was not able to achieve much 
success selling its cars through Mitsubishi in Japan. Strong government action seemed 
the only viable alternative. 
The ascendancy of Ronald Reagan to the American Presidency strained U.S.-
Japanese relations still further. Both Japanese and American leaders had to answer to 
their own constituencies and did not wish to seem weak on such an important issue. 
Reagan also had to deal with the official U.S. policy of free trade. On the advice of his 
Cabinet-level automobile task force, the American President decided to encourage (but 
not force) Japan to voluntarily limit its shipments of Japanese vehicles to the United 
States.
26 Reagan hoped this would free up a greater share of the U.S. car market for 
domestic manufacturers and allow him, since the imposition of formal import quotas was 
neither involved nor threatened, to avoid being perceived as a supporter of protectionism. 
Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito said that Japan would only respond to a specific 
request.
27 The United States made a semi-official request, and the Japanese agreed to   12
institute a three-year export quota of 1.68 million vehicles that would start in 1981.
28 The 
Japanese policy of export restraints from a decade earlier had been resurrected. 
At this point the United States was actually attempting to buy time. The American 
automobile manufacturers had convinced the U.S. government that their industry needed 
relief from foreign competition. That relief, which would increase domestic sales through 
the accompanying import reduction, would provide sufficient revenue to finance the 
retooling costs required for the production of smaller, more fuel-efficient cars.
29 The 
agreement, negotiated by United States trade representative Bill Brock and Japanese 
Cabinet officials, was meant to secure the necessary breathing room. The initial 1.68 
million quota for 1981 was below the 1980 import total of 1.8 million Japanese cars -- 
though not as far below as the auto industry had hoped. In year two of the agreement, the 
quota would increase only if the size of the U.S. domestic car market expanded. The 
Japanese government was allowed to set its own limit for the third year.
30
The agreement was exceptionally unpopular in Japan and received unusually 
vociferous criticism. Nevertheless, Japanese authorities had little choice but to come to 
such a compromise. The U.S. automobile manufacturers had demanded much more, and 
they had support in the U.S. Senate which was considering the Danforth-Bensten Bill. 
The latter, were it enacted, would have instituted a significantly more drastic reduction in 
Japanese imports.
31 The export-quota deal was expected to allow U.S. automakers 
immediately to raise domestic car prices by 3%, increasing costs by $200-$400 per small 
car for the consumer.
32 Ryoichi Hirono, professor of economics at Seikei University, 
concluded that the agreement was of benefit to only “a handful of politicians, some lazy 
managers and certain irresponsible trade officials.”
33  13
Indeed, the export of Japanese automobiles to the United States was becoming a 
significant political issue in the two countries. After Japan announced that it would not 
increase its 1981 quota limit in 1982, its Foreign Minister, Yoshio Sakurauchi, warned 
that the Japanese were beginning to think that the United States was using Japan as a 
scapegoat for its domestic economic problems.
34 He responded to the repeated charges 
that Japanese markets were closed to U.S. producers with the assertion that such a view 
was based on outdated perceptions.
35 The rhetoric on both sides of the Pacific was 
heating up. 
The merits of the voluntary system for limiting cars exported to the United States 
were ambiguous. With the system fixing only the number of cars exported to the U.S., the 
Japanese began to focus on bigger and more expensive models.
36 They were thus able to 
increase the value of vehicle shipments to the U.S. while conforming to the voluntary 
limit. But now American automakers were threatened with being squeezed in the higher 
price-range vehicle market, an area where they were traditionally most successful. And, 
in addition to the possibility of falling victim to the repositioning of Japanese imports to 
higher quality products, U.S. producers were not even making headway in recovering 
their domestic market shares. Despite this, the Reagan Administration still wanted to 
extend the restraints on Japanese motor imports that were to expire in March of 1983.
37
President Reagan met with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in 
Washington on January 18, 1983 primarily to discuss automobile trade and related 
matters. The Japanese Prime Minister assumed a tone of appeasement. He suggested that 
a solution to the trade problem lay in joint ventures between American and Japanese 
manufacturers. He explained the Japanese success as a by-product of its ambitious and   14
hardworking labor force. Mr. Nakasone also asserted that the new generation in Japan 
looked toward an active, cooperative role in the world. He pointed out that Japanese 
school children learned English and studied matters that relate to the selling of Japanese 
products in the U.S. -- something that American school children did not do with respect 
to Japan.
38 Despite proclaiming that the two leaders were able to avoid a trade war, the 
conference itself achieved very little in resolving the U.S.-Japanese automobile issue. 
The failure of the quota system to initiate recovery of the U.S. automobile 
industry was clear in 1983. Nevertheless, American manufacturers still insisted upon an 
extension of the quotas. MITI Minister Sadanori Yamanaka said that Japan would 
continue to hold its automobile exports to the U.S. at 1.69 million vehicles. This, again, 
was a response to an explicit threat that Congress might act to drastically reduce car 
imports from Japan.
39 Bill Brock had remarked that such measures were necessary 
because the U.S. market was much more open to Japan than those of other industrial 
nations. In fact, while Japanese cars accounted for 23% of the U.S. market, they were 
held to only an 11% share in the United Kingdom and a mere 3% share in France.
40 The 
U.S. market was clearly a major attraction to Japanese producers. 
The grievances of American automobile firms against Japanese producers 
continued to mount. Ford, Chrysler and AMC (the American Motor Company) 
complained that the weak Japanese yen (in relation to the dollar) gave superior profit 
margins to Japanese motor companies selling cars in the United States. In addition, they 
cited the Japanese practice of giving tax breaks on exports as further evidence of the 
unfair cost advantage that Japanese firms held in relation to their American 
counterparts.
41 It was estimated that Japanese assembly costs were lower than those of   15
U.S. firms by $1,500-$2,000 per car sold on the U.S. market.
42 American motor 
manufacturers also claimed that restrictions such as the voluntary quota agreement would 
be needed for years if the U.S. auto industry was to survive. Ford's President Donald E. 
Peterson threatened that, since Ford was loosing money on its best-selling subcompact 
(the Escort), the replacement for that car would be built outside North America where 
assembly costs are lower.
43 Japan announced that it would renew the voluntary export 
quota but raised the limit to 1.85 million units for the 1984 fiscal year.
44 The adverse 
reactions of Ford, Chrysler and AMC to this announcement put more political pressure on 
the Reagan Administration to deal with Japan, and threatened to escalate trade tensions 
between the two economic powers still further. 
However, dissension appeared for the first time among American automakers 
over the value of the quota system when General Motors failed to ally with rest of the 
U.S. industry in opposing a complete lifting of the Japanese self-imposed export quotas. 
A company that historically focused on the manufacture of upscale, luxury cars, GM did 
not feel threatened by smaller, cheaper, low-end Japanese imports. If anything, it feared 
that the import limitations were pushing the Japanese into the luxury car market, 
portending increased competition there. General Motors also had established strong 
working relationships with Isuzu and Suzuki and wished to reduce the import barriers so 
that it could import more cars assembled by them to sell in the U.S.
45
General Motors had also come to the conclusion that it would be very difficult to 
out-compete the Japanese in the small-car, low-end market. Even with a substantial 
increase in American productive efficiency, the Japanese would still have considerable 
cost advantages due not only to the weak yen and export tax breaks in Japan, but also to   16
the difference in “social systems.” The latter, no doubt, stemmed from the social and 
cultural differences between the two countries alluded to earlier.
46 These would include 
the closer working relationship between producers and suppliers in Japan, the loyalty of 
the Japanese labor force in contrast with the strength and adversarial nature of labor 
unions in the United States, the closer associations between banks and businesses in 
Japan, and the greater governmental involvement in industry in Japan. The difficulty of 
entering the Japanese domestic car market was clearly enhanced by such social and 
cultural factors. General Motors gave up the fight because it did not seem worth the 
effort; and it was a fight that GM did not think it needed to win. 
The division within the U.S. automobile industry served temporarily to ameliorate 
tensions between the Reagan administration and the Japanese leadership. For the next 
two years Japan continued to renew the voluntary export quotas for its cars. However, 
pressure from the U.S. motor industry continued to mount. Since it could do little to close 
up the American automobile market to Japan, the U.S. government reverted to an old 
strategy: develop a significant American share of the Japanese car-parts industry. But a 
familiar problem had to be overcome, namely, the close relations between Japanese 
manufacturers and their Japanese suppliers.
47 In order to break those relations, the 
Americans represented U.S. auto parts (if not their cars) to the Japanese as cost-efficient 
and of high quality. The latter responded that U.S. parts were not only inferior, but also 
more expensive than domestic parts.
48 In fact, the vehicle parts produced by U.S. 
companies were different from the leading Japanese brands. The U.S. versions were not 
necessarily poorer in quality but, because the Japanese manufacturers bought parts only 
from suppliers from whom they had established long-term relations, U.S. parts had never   17
had the opportunity to be tested comprehensively in Japanese cars. In this case it was the 
Japanese production system that inadvertently reduced American manufacturers' ability 
to compete. 
There were signs in the late 1980's that Japan's domestic market might be inching 
towards greater liberalization. Such hopes, however, soon turned out to be overly 
optimistic. The economic expansion in Japan in the mid-1980's was accompanied by an 
increase in the value of the yen and a simplification of automobile testing that made it 
easier for foreign cars to pass. That, in turn, produced an enlargement of Japan's global 
imports by 25% in 1986.
49 The trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan, though, 
could not be masked by this surge. In 1985, the United States sold $190 million worth of 
car parts to Japan (not much different from the amount negotiated five years earlier), 
while Japan exported a whopping $5.2 billion worth of Japanese parts to the United 
States.
50 American negotiators, in an effort to bridge the parts-trade deficit, attempted to 
force the Japanese to establish concrete numerical goals for increasing the purchase of 
American parts by Japanese automakers. But, unlike the early 1980's, the Japanese 
refused to yield to American pressure and exert governmental control in this way over 
private industry. In August of 1987, the only concessions American negotiators were able 




The Bush Administration and Japan
The failure of the Reagan administration to find a solution to the automobile 
impasse between the U.S. and Japan put more pressure on President George H.W. Bush   18
(the older George Bush) to resolve it. His efforts seemed to be helped by the ascension of 
Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. The new Prime Minister wanted to 
internationalize Japanese society by, among other things, deregulating industry, 
increasing enforcement of anti-trust laws, using land more effectively, and enhancing the 
efficiency of the distribution system.
52 Although these measures had been pushed by the 
United States since the 1960's, Kaifu nevertheless maintained that they were not intended 
as concessions to the United States but, rather, as general improvements for the 
betterment of Japanese life. Regardless of the motivation, however, a feeling of hope 
emerged among American negotiators and observers that a productive agreement was 
now within reach of the two economic powers. 
American optimism again proved premature, and the misunderstandings of 
different modes of operation and cultural values are apparent: The March 1990 talks 
between the U.S. and Japan yielded as little as previous endeavors. But the two sides did 
exchange accusations. The Americans contended that the Japanese permitted 
monopolistic practices in Japan, keeping domestic prices high and reducing consumption. 
The Japanese retorted that the American public did not save enough and failed to 
properly invest in research, education, and development.
53 There seemed little incentive 
for either side to compromise. James C. Abegglen, president of a Tokyo consulting firm, 
pointed out that the trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan was an American 
domestic problem (the same conclusion GM came to earlier).
54 There was no guarantee 
that changes in the Japanese system would actually lead to higher U.S. exports. It was 
unlikely, then, that America's domestic problem could be solved through international 
negotiations.   19
It is important to realize that the challenges faced by the Americans and the 
Japanese in establishing a fair economic relationship changed significantly in the ten 
years between 1980 and 1990. When Reagan assumed office, he was pressured by 
American manufacturers to curb Japanese penetration of the U.S. domestic market. That 
was the goal of the quota agreement for automobiles. By 1990, however, the American 
public had become worried over the growing trade imbalance between the United States 
and the rest of the world -- particularly Japan. The U.S. trade deficit with Japan had 
reached $49 billion by 1989.
55 America seemed to be losing its footing as the world's 
most powerful economy, and the trade deficit was the primary culprit. Furthermore, 
despite the metamorphosis to an intrinsically new trade problem, the apparent closedness 
of Japanese markets to foreign producers was once again declared the underlying cause 
of Japan's advantage in trade. 
The new trade environment had two unfamiliar features. First, rising 
unemployment and falling manufactured output, caused by a declining domestic 
automobile market share held by American companies, were no longer major issues since 
most Japanese car companies had set up production facilities in the United States. The 
small, durable, and inexpensive automobiles for which the Japanese were famous were 
now produced within U.S. borders. The Japanese produced the higher-end vehicles 
domestically and exported them to the U.S. to make up the bulk of the voluntary export 
quota. During this era, Japanese car manufacturers made significant inroads into the 
luxury car market with the introduction of the Lexus brand by Toyota, the Acura line by 
Honda, and the Infiniti cars of Mitsubishi. The number of vehicles imported from Japan 
did not increase significantly from the early 1980's, but their combined value rose   20
enormously. The Japanese, earning large profit margins on luxury exports sent to 
America from Japan, were content with lower margins on U.S.-built Japanese cars. 
Regardless, the high value of U.S. automobile imports was one of the underlying causes 
of the immense trade deficit the United States had with Japan. 
The second feature of the new trade environment was the Japanese motor 
producers' insistence on importing from Japan a large percentage of the parts that went 
into their U.S.-built models. Despite the fact that these automobiles were officially made 
or assembled in the United States, up to half of their components were manufactured 
outside the U.S. and shipped from Japan (replacement parts followed a similar pattern). 
Thus the increased domestic production of automobiles in the U.S. exacerbated the trade 
imbalance with Japan. In addition, while the Japanese built entire production and 
distribution networks in the United States during the 1980's, American car manufacturers 
achieved no increase in market share in Japan. The fate of American car-parts producers 
was even worse because now a large number of U.S. built vehicles did not use 
exclusively American parts. Not only were American parts manufacturers not able to 
expand in Japan, but they also lost some of their U.S. market share to Japanese parts 
producers. 
With the pressure to reduce the trade deficit mounting, President Bush was forced, 
like past presidents, to try to pry open Japanese markets for U.S. producers. In this 
regard, the stated goal was “to make it as easy for Americans to do business in Japan as 
for the Japanese to do business [in the U.S.].”
56 He persuaded the Japanese to remove 
some restrictions on retail stores and to alter tax policies so that more land would be 
made available for commercial and residential use.
57 However, these were not actually   21
concessions since they were consistent with Kaifu's domestic reform program. At the 
same time, of course, they would also serve American (or any other foreign) interests that 
wished to establish retail distribution networks in Japan. Land, in particular, would 
become easier to acquire for the purpose of building automobile dealerships. Even so, up 
to this point Bush, like his predecessors, failed to procure any specific concessions from 
the Japanese that would reduce the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance. To obtain such 
concessions, President Bush went to Japan in January of 1992. 
The trip was a make-or-brake endeavor for Bush in so far as his Japanese trade 
policy was concerned. In 1991, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan still stood at $43.4 
billion and accounted for 66% of the entire world-wide U.S. trade deficit.
58 Three 
quarters of the deficit with Japan was directly related to automobiles and car parts.
59 The 
publicly stated goal of the trip was to eliminate impediments to free trade and to end 
exclusionary business practices in Japan.
60 But the public agenda was not what the 
Americans actually asked of the Japanese. Rather, the U.S. delegations requested, and the 
Japanese agreed, to help reduce the U.S. trade deficit by hindering the free flow of trade 
though the provision of subsidized loans to, and voluntary import targets for Japanese 
corporations. MITI Vice Minister for International Affairs, Noboru Hatakeyama also 
promised a “moral campaign” in Japan to spur imports from the U.S. 
The difference between the results of these negotiations and all prior ones was the 
specific, numerical guarantees, however small, that Bush was able to elicit from the 
Japanese. They included an agreement to increase the purchase of U.S. cars and auto 
parts from $9 billion to $19 billion by 1995. Japan would similarly increase the 
percentage of U.S. parts-components in U.S. built Japanese cars from 50% to at least   22
70%. Japan also promised to revise its domestic testing standards for automobiles to 
reduce the difficulty that foreign cars encountered in passing those tests. Finally, in 
perhaps the most frivolous but highly symbolic promise of all, the Japanese agreed to 
help the Americans boost their sales up to 36,000 cars in the Japanese domestic 
automobile market. The promise was practically devoid of economic significance 
because the 36,000 cars would, at the time, amount to a market share of 0.7% of the 5.1 
million cars in the Japanese new car market.
61
During the 1992 election campaign, the Republican Party hailed Bush's trip to 
Japan as a great victory. Nevertheless, the Japanese promises fell far short of American 
expectations and of any significant reduction in the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance. The 
increased imports from the U.S. were not nearly enough to make up the annual U.S. trade 
deficit with Japan. Harold Poling, chairman of the Ford Motor Company, asserted bluntly 
that in so far as the auto industry was concerned the agreements were inadequate.
62 There 
was, indeed, a sincere attempt by the Japanese to make market entry easier for foreign 
firms. But in order to meet the agreed-on goals of increased import purchases of U.S. 
autos and parts (which they could not and did not reach), the Japanese would have had to 
disrupt, to some extent, their highly-valued (by them), long-term relations between 
manufacturers and suppliers, and undertake what amounted to managed trade.
63 Although 
there were some minor gains, history has shown that the Bush agreements failed both to 
open up Japanese markets significantly to U.S. manufacturers and to reduce the trade 
deficit between the United States and Japan. A.M. Rosenthal, who was quoted at the start 
of this paper, was right, and by the end of Bush's term of office, little had changed since 
1967.   23
 
The Final Negotiations on Automobiles under President Clinton
The last serious automobile-trade talks of the 20
th century involving the U.S. and 
Japan arose between 1993 and 1995 during President Bill Clinton's first term. This time a 
trade war nearly erupted as America came within minutes of instituting a defensive tariff 
against Japanese luxury cars. The trade imbalance remained a heated topic, and Clinton 
tried to employ Bush's strategy of persuading the Japanese to agree to concrete numerical 
import targets that would open up specific markets and generally reduce their trade 
surplus with the United States. The Japanese responded by arguing that such targets 
would violate the spirit of free trade.
64 In return, the Americans, reverting to their old 
positions, maintained that existing domestic market restrictions already made Japan a 
non-free trade economy. These allegations dominated the discussions of June 1993 and 
no agreement was reached. 
The problems facing President Clinton were similar to those with which the 
previous Bush administration had to deal: Japanese firms were now producing cars within 
the borders of the United States, making quotas obsolete. And Japan's trade surplus with 
the world had grown to $100 billion by 1993. Possibly believing he was faced with no 
other viable alternative, Clinton turned to pressuring the Japanese into buying more 
American products. In terms of automobiles, this meant increasing Japanese purchases of 
U.S. vehicles and parts.
65
President Clinton, following his predecessors, thought that protectionism in the 
form of Japanese domestic market regulations and restrictions was keeping American 
firms from achieving economic success in Japan, and that, in turn, was responsible for the   24
one-sided trade and the U.S. trade deficit. Japanese Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae 
disagreed, pointing to the U.S. budget deficit and Japan's recession as more likely 
causes.
66 The American President refused to be swayed by such a response and insisted 
on targets to force the Japanese to meet American expectations. The latter included 
lowering Japan's world-wide trade surplus from 4% to 1.5% of that nation's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and increasing imports from 3% to 4% of its GDP.
67 The 
Clinton administration also wanted Japanese companies to increase U.S. car-parts 
purchases by 20% over three years.
68 Clinton viewed the failure of his Republican 
predecessors to solve the trade imbalance problem as a result of an inability to evaluate 
whether Japan was actually taking steps towards reducing the surplus and whether those 
steps were, in fact, successful. He backed up U.S. pressure by threatening to impose 
restrictive tariffs on imported Japanese automobiles, such as, for example, increasing the 
minivan import tariff from 2.5% to 25%.
69 For the first time it seemed that the United 
States would openly disregard free trade in favor of appeasing domestic constituencies. 
Talks were resumed in January of 1994. The same allegations and 
misinterpretations dominated these meetings. One observer was driven to remark that 
“there [was] not even agreement on the nature of the problem.”
70 The United States 
wanted more retail dealerships in Japan to carry American-made cars, and demanded 
quantified import guarantees. The Japanese retorted that the only way to achieve such 
specific targets was through the unacceptable use of managed trade (that is, by interfering 
with their culturally grounded long-term relations between manufacturers, wholesalers, 
and retailers), and the Japanese government was not willing to engage in this practice. 
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa did see a need for deregulation and a shift of   25
economic power from producers to consumers.
71 He even acknowledged that the 
purchase of automobiles and insurance ought not to be dictated by the traditional 
Japanese system of long-term relations at the retail level between buyers and sellers, but 
merely by price and quality. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister was not able to reach an 
agreement over how to deregulate Japanese markets or open them to foreign firms and 
investors. The two leaders agreed to meet every six months in an attempt to iron out their 
difficulties. On both the American and Japanese sides, political considerations seemed to 
prohibit a more rational discussion of possible trade resolutions. 
By 1994, Japan was mired in its worst post-World-War-II recession. With the yen 
relatively weak, it had been attempting to revive its domestic economy with increased 
exports. This policy had caused the U.S. trade deficit with Japan to balloon to $60 billion 
in 1993.
72 The climate in which trade negotiations between Japan and the United States 
were taking place had deteriorated accordingly. In the United States, the massive trade 
deficit was draining the morale of the American public and becoming a major political 
issue. In Japan, any acceptance of trade targets would breed popular resentment. Japan 
was also concerned that if it signed an agreement that called for specific targets, and if it 
were unable to meet those targets, then the U.S. would judge that it had legal grounds for 
retaliation. In this regard, Japan was fearful of repeating a similar disastrous situation of a 
few years earlier involving an agreement with the U.S. over semiconductors.
73 Clearly, a 
great deal of mistrust had developed on both sides of the negotiating table. 
On October 1, 1994, the two nations were finally able to reach an agreement that 
partially opened some Japanese markets to U.S. producers. The markets covered included 
insurance, glass, and medical and telecommunications equipment.
74 Again, the U.S.   26
delegation had to settle for only minor concessions while the main issue was ignored: 
American car manufacturers still seemed to be, from their perspective, largely frozen out 
of the Japanese markets for automobiles and replacement parts. This was especially 
significant since, by then, automobiles and related products accounted for $40 billion of 
Japan's $60 billion surplus with the U.S.
75 American car makers contended that their 
Japanese counterparts pressured dealers there not to stock U.S. cars. In their view, 
Japanese dealers were not free to enter into franchise agreements with U.S. automobile 
producers.
76 Japanese Trade Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto proposed a dealership match-
making scheme in which both American and Japanese officials would survey each 
Japanese dealership and ascertain what their managers actually wanted.
77 The American 
negotiators rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would take too long to 
implement, and held no guarantee of resolving the problem. The Americans were looking 
for concrete promises while the Japanese proposed further investigation. 
The tariff that President Clinton had threatened to impose on Japanese 
automobiles – “Super 301” -- was the most drastic measure available to him.
78 This 
unprecedented pressure exerted on Japan was the only reason the October 1
st agreement 
was reached. Although the U.S. gave up its effort to increase American producers' share 
of the Japanese automobile and replacement-parts markets, it nonetheless retained the 
right to revisit that issue with possible future sanctions.
79 The tariff sanctions, had they 
been invoked, would have been, in part, a response to American exclusion from the 
Japanese $40 billion car-parts market where, in 1994, the U.S. held a meager 1.2% 
share.
80 The Japanese had refused any concessions in this area, claiming that American   27
demands would force Japan to end an automobile inspection system that saved Japanese 
lives.
81
Several months later, in the spring of 1995, United States trade representative 
Mickey Kantor met with Minister Hashimoto specifically to discuss automobile trade 
issues. The American side entered these negotiations with three straightforward demands: 
1. Japanese auto dealers would sell Ford, Chrysler, and GM vehicles. 
Since it was very time-consuming and expensive for foreign firms to establish 
their own distribution networks in Japan, this would quickly and cheaply open the 
Japanese retail market to American automobile manufacturers. 
2. Restrictions on imports of automobile parts would be reduced. The 
repair car-parts market was especially lucrative in Japan where all operational 
automobiles had to undergo frequent and extensive testing, and subsequent 
repairs. 
3. Japanese car companies were to sign voluntary agreements to greatly 
increase American parts usage in their vehicles.
82
It was the third demand that drew the most strenuous objections from the Japanese 
negotiators. Minister Hashimoto insisted that the Japanese government should dictate 
neither the quantity nor the source of purchases made by private companies.
83
Despite the trade agreement of October 1994, the U.S. renewed its threat of severe 
trade sanctions, and Japan responded with is own threats to appeal any such impositions 
to the World Trade Organization. American negotiators claimed that the Japanese 
inspection system discriminated against the U.S. because the auto manufacturers own the 
garages in Japan and use the parts made by their Japanese suppliers for the repairs   28
required by the inspections.
84 The U.S. demanded increased purchases of American car 
parts, but the Japanese repeated their insistence that any changes in their inspection 
system would undermine safety standards.
85 Clinton then threatened Japan with $5.9 
billion worth of tariffs on 13 Japanese luxury car models if an agreement was not reached 
by 12:01A.M. on June 29, 1995.
86 Polls indicated that the President had the support of 
70% of the American public on this issue.
87 A trade war loomed on the horizon. 
Negotiations went down to the wire, with both sides recognizing the need to avoid 
a trade war. An agreement was finally reached at two o'clock in the morning on the 29
th 
of June -- two hours after the sanctions were supposed to have gone into effect. The deal 
featured four main points: (1) Japanese auto manufacturers in the U.S. would increase 
production by 25% to 2.65 million vehicles by 1998; (2) Japan would import $2 billion 
more in American car parts; (3) MITI would send a letter to all Japanese automobile 
dealers confirming their right to sell foreign cars; and (4) Japan would deregulate its 
automobile repair and inspection systems.
88 The Japanese agreed to specific targets only 
with the provision that no means of enforcing them would be available to the U.S. 
Clinton hoped that the mere existence of specific target numbers would provide enough 
incentive for the Japanese to meet them.
89 It might be said that, with this agreement, 
Clinton achieved his publicly-stated goal of obtaining such targets. But without recourse 
to enforcement, the deal was as weak as its predecessors. 
There were two important repercussions to this last set of U.S.-Japanese 
negotiations. First, Japan had finally had enough of American hard line negotiating 
tactics that involved the threat of tariffs. In 1996, Japan decided to scrap all efforts at one-
on-one trade negotiations with the United States in favor of dealing through multinational   29
organizations like the World Trade Organization. In so far as trade negotiations with the 
U.S. were concerned, the era of bilateralism was over.
90
Second, American automobile manufacturers at last began to engage the Japanese 
car market in a serious way. After 30 years of refusing to allocate sufficient investment 
funds to make headway in entering that market, they finally announced plans to open 
sales outlets in, and build cars specifically for it. In particular, the latter meant, in part, 
providing automobiles with the steering wheel on the right-hand side of the vehicle. At 
the 1995 Tokyo Motor Show, Chrysler unveiled five new right-hand-drive models. It also 
planned to begin exporting right-hand-drive Jeep Grand Cherokees to Japan from Austria 
and to recruit enough Japanese dealerships to expand its sales outlets in Japan from 100 
to 500 over the next five years. The company hoped for an increase in yearly sales in 
Japan from 16,200 in 1995 to 100,000 in 2000.
91 Ford announced plans to begin 
exporting right-hand-drive versions of the Taurus and Explorer to Japan. It also intended 
to increase its sales outlets in Japan from 310 to 700 by the year 2000, with anticipated 
annual sales increases from 56,000 to 200,000.
92 General Motors, too, announced plans 
for a new, right-hand-drive version of the Chevrolet Cavalier to be made in cooperation 
with Mazda and to begin exporting to Japan a right-hand-drive version of the Saturn. GM 
hoped to increase its sales in Japan from 55,000 per year to 100,000 by the new 
millennium.
93 The U.S. car industry thus projected ambitious increases in Japanese sales 
from just over 100,000 in 1995 to 400,000 by the year 2000. (Ford was the only 
American manufacturer to export right-hand-drive vehicles to Japan prior to 1995. Only 
two models were involved: the Probe [manufactured in Michigan] and the Mondeo 
[assembled in Belgium].




The pledges to focus on selling cars and parts in Japan after the 1995 agreement 
were especially refreshing considering the fact that American manufacturers had made 
only half-hearted attempts to enter the Japanese car and parts markets in earlier decades. 
General Motors was the first to admit that it had never really tried to compete in Japan. 
G. Richard Wagoner, Jr., President of North American General Motors operations openly 
confessed that not aggressively pursuing the Japanese market had been a big mistake.
95 
William Raferty, consultant to the auto-parts industry, found in a survey that two out of 
three U.S. parts makers were more preoccupied with cutting costs and competing 
domestically than in exporting to Japan.
96
As suggested above, none of the Big Three U.S. car manufacturers had made any 
serious financial investments in Japan. While the Japanese spent billions of dollars to 
adapt to the American market, the U.S. automakers merely exported to Japan what they 
produced for the U.S. or other established markets. Early on, both Ford and GM had 
invested heavily in production plants and distribution networks in Europe, allowing them 
to obtain a combined 25% of the market share there. But in Japan, no such effort was 
made until Chrysler announced plans to purchase an existing Japanese distribution 
company in 1995.
97 The American car-parts industry had similarly neglected Japan. 
The excuse for such neglect given by the American firms was that the existing 
trade barriers indigenous to Japan discouraged them from even making an effort. The 
Motor and Equipment Manufacturer Association attributed the listless attitude to   31
frustration from being shut out of Japanese markets.
98 Exactly how a company could be 
shut out of a market it never seriously tried to enter remained unclear. And the 
hollowness of the American claim was further exposed by the considerable greater 
success of European manufacturers in exporting automobiles to Japan.
99 Nevertheless, the 
makers of American cars and parts succeeded in convincing the American public and 
government that Japan was actively excluding them from its markets. It could be argued 
that the American automobile industry wanted the U.S. government to give it an 
investment-free ride into Japanese markets by forcing the Japanese to accept American 
business customs and American products that were neither consistent with Japanese 
economic and cultural traditions nor suited to the Japanese situation. But in the free-
enterprise environment of the American economy, it was not the government's fight. And, 
in any case, the American side could not win on these terms. 
There were (and still are in many quarters) numerous elements of Japanese 
society and the structure of its economy that could not be changed through negotiation. 
The elements themselves, as well as the fact of their unchangeability, do not seem to have 
been understood by the Americans (businessmen, negotiators, and the public). To repeat 
the example most frequently cited above, the Japanese business tradition warrants the 
maintenance of close, long-tern relationships between firms and their suppliers to a far 
greater extent than in the United States. In that tradition, firms and suppliers would often 
agree on long-term contracts that, in the case of automobiles, would turn out to act as a 
structural impediment to trade.
100 Bound by those long-run contracts that often involved 
specially designed parts, it was very difficult for Japanese manufacturers to switch 
suppliers and virtually impossible to do so in the short term. Therefore, when American   32
trade representatives would demand greater Japanese purchases of U.S. parts for the 
following year, the Japanese could not really give in. Furthermore, whereas in the United 
States manufacturing practices tended to require the stockpiling of inventories of parts, 
Japanese producers worked on the so-called just-in-time system.
101 In the case of the 
latter, parts would arrive on the day they were needed, sometimes necessitating multiple 
daily deliveries from the same supplier. Such a system posed a logistical nightmare for 
prospective international suppliers whose order-taking and delivery-times virtually 
precluded their participation in it. 
The Keiretsu system in Japan inadvertently served as another “protectionist” 
source against foreign competition. This system of interlocking companies and groups of 
companies had been in operation, in one form or another, since the 19
th century. Related 
firms would buy and sell exclusively from each other. They would set prices, restrict the 
flow of goods, and do their best to prevent outsiders from entering their markets.
102 
Although widely accepted in Japan, such business practices seemed unfairly monopolistic 
to Americans. Moreover, the latter thought this, like the Japanese reliance on long-term 
relations and contracts, to be an economic issue and not one pertaining to social 
organization. They and their negotiators failed to realize that international diplomacy 
cannot alter the culture of a nation. Asking the Japanese to surrender these practices 
would be like asking Americans to abandon the pursuit of their self interest or the 
maintenance of equal opportunity for all. It was just not going to happen. 
In general terms, then, the Americans viewed themselves as victims. Japan had 
taken advantage of America's open markets and its generosity. All they wanted was for 
Japan to reciprocate by playing by the same rules as, in their minds, everyone else. But   33
Japan refused to do this by unfairly closing off its markets to foreign competition.
103 The 
oversimplifications and misunderstandings in this position are obvious. 
Japan, on the other hand, was blinded by its own oversimplifications and 
misunderstandings. The Japanese felt that they were smarter and more diligent than their 
competition, but were rewarded with only scorn and threats. They had, from their 
perspective, been as fair to other countries as other countries were to each other. They 
had been used as the scapegoat for U.S. economic failures.
104 And the Japanese reacted 
with contempt to what they perceived those failures to be. They believed that their 
superior cultural ethos had been the agent of their success, and that “virulent racism” on 
the part of the Americans was the underlying cause of trade frictions with the United 
States.
105 Apart from its oversimplifications and misunderstandings, this stance was as 
hypocritical and arrogant as that of the U.S. towards Japan. 
Japan had also been both insensitive and insular. It had sought to make up for its 
dependence on foreign sources for raw materials and to recover from economic hard 
times through exporting. But it ignored the adverse effects of this strategy on other 
countries, and the costs of the consequent difficult relations with its trading partners. 
Japan did not fully recognize the perception by foreigners (and the extent to which that 
perception was an actual domestic reality) that its markets were unusually hard for them 
to penetrate. And it attempted to deflect criticism with, in part, the dubious claim that 
macroeconomic elements, such as the relatively low savings rates in the U.S., were the 
main cause of the large U.S. trade deficits.
106
The negotiators on both sides failed to see that there were two equally 
fundamental problems: (1) the difficulties encountered by foreign producers attempting to   34
enter Japanese markets, and (2) the shortcomings of U.S. industry that permitted Japan to 
export so successfully to the United States.
107 They also failed to recognize the 
underlying cultural differences that were the primary cause of those problems and that 
made their resolution so difficult: An emphasis on “rights versus obligation, on autonomy 
versus interdependence, on the pursuit of happiness versus personal sacrifice, and on the 
priority of the individual versus that of the group.”
108 The sources of the imbalance of 
trade between the U.S. and Japan were thus domestic and internal, one arising in each 
country, and stemmed from the particular structural organization of the U.S. and Japanese 
economies. Each government should have devoted its energies to addressing these issues 
with respect to the underlying cultural backgrounds of the other. But they did not, and 
thereby brought the United States and Japan to the brink of a trade war. 
There are many lessons that can be drawn from the failed automobile-trade 
negotiations between the United States and Japan during the 2
nd half of the 20
th century. 
The one emphasized here is the absolute necessity in any cross-cultural negotiations for 
both sides to understand the cultural and social backgrounds of each other, and the 
constraints imposed by those backgrounds on what can be accomplished. In any 
particular case, it may not be possible to resolve all issues, or even very many of them. 
And what agreements are reached may require a considerable amount of time and effort 
to attain. But surely, negotiating from positions in which each side understands the 
constraints under which the other operates is the best way to reduce tensions, avoid 
disasters, and achieve the most progress. 
The deep cultural, social, and economic divide separating the U.S. and Japan, a 
lack of understanding of which, in particular, seems to have played a major role in   35
preventing the Japanese and American automobile negotiators from reaching meaningful 
agreements during the 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's, has not gone away. It will almost 
certainly arise in a variety of contexts and come to the fore implicitly, if not explicitly, in 
future Japanese-American relations. We can only hope that the individuals on both sides 
entrusted with resolving the specific problems that arise will remember the failure of the 
automobile negotiations of the latter part of the 20
th century, and will, as a result, be 
sensitive to the unchangeable cultural, social, and economic practices and constraints that 
separate the two countries. Trade wars, if the issues are economic, hurt everyone and can 
be devastating -- as the experience of the 1930's suggests. It was George Santayana, the 
Spanish-born philosopher, who, in The Life of Reason (volume 1, p.284) wrote, “Those 
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